What happens when an online shop’s certificate expires and the person who renewed it manually a year ago no longer works for the company? The shop stops taking orders, and customers’ browsers display a warning about an untrusted connection. The calendar reminder was going to a mailbox that no longer exists. The replacement itself is simple, but first someone has to work out where the certificate is installed and who has access to the account with the issuer.
With certificates valid for more than a year, such a slip could happen at most once a year per certificate. The timeline adopted by the CA/Browser Forum changes that arithmetic: from 2029, a 47-day certificate will be the longest-lived SSL certificate a public certificate authority may issue, with intermediate stages of 200 and 100 days along the way. For cybersecurity this is good news, because it shortens the time during which a compromised or misissued certificate remains valid. For the IT team, it is a deadline by which renewals must stop depending on one person’s memory.
What does Ballot SC-081 change about TLS certificate validity?
Ballot SC-081 adds to the CA/Browser Forum requirements a multi-year schedule for reducing the maximum validity of public TLS certificates and the periods for which validation data may be reused. According to the SC081v3 ballot page, voting ran from 4 to 11 April 2025, and in the certificate issuer category 25 members voted in favour, none against and 5 abstained. All four voting certificate consumers, namely Apple, Google, Microsoft and Mozilla, supported the ballot.
The motion was proposed by Clint Wilson of Apple and endorsed by representatives of Sectigo, Google Chrome and Mozilla. The ballot amends the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates”, known as the TLS BR. The revision table in version 2.3.1 of those requirements, dated 4 October 2026, states that the SC081 changes entered version 2.1.5, adopted on 11 April 2025 and effective from 16 May 2025.
Version 2.3.1 was the current version on 25 October 2026 and contains the schedule in the same form. The requirements bind certificate authorities because they are enforced by browser and operating system vendors, who decide which authorities their users’ software trusts.
What is the timeline for cutting certificate validity to 47 days?
The timeline has four thresholds that depend on the date a certificate is issued. Section 6.3.2 of the TLS BR version 2.3.1 sets them out as follows:
- a certificate issued before 15 March 2026 must not be valid for longer than 398 days, and the recommendation is no more than 397;
- a certificate issued from 15 March 2026 to 14 March 2027 may be valid for no more than 200 days;
- a certificate issued from 15 March 2027 to 14 March 2029 may be valid for no more than 100 days;
- a certificate issued from 15 March 2029 may be valid for no more than 47 days, and the recommendation is no more than 46.
On 25 October 2026, therefore, the second threshold applies. A certificate issued on 25 October 2026 can be valid until mid-May 2027 at the latest, and the one that replaces it in spring 2027 will already have a limit half as long.
The requirements count a day as 86,400 seconds, and any fraction beyond that as an additional day. That is why, as Section 6.3.2 notes, authorities should not issue certificates for the maximum permissible time by default. Planning renewals right up against the limit is a bad idea for the same reason.
What does a shorter reuse period for domain validation mean?
The ballot also shortens the time for which a certificate authority may rely on an earlier check that the applicant controls the domain. Section 4.2.1 of the TLS BR provides for domain name and IP address validation 398 days before 15 March 2026, then 200 days, 100 days from 15 March 2027, and only 10 days from 15 March 2029.
Subject identity information, meaning the details of the organisation included in organisation-validated certificates, could be reused for 825 days, and since 15 March 2026 for 398 days. This change mainly affects processes on the side of the authority and the team that submits documents.
The final domain validation threshold changes more than the validity period does. With a ten-day window, control of the domain almost always has to be confirmed afresh at renewal. Manually adding a DNS record or a file on a server stops being a one-off task and becomes a permanent part of every replacement.
Why is the CA/Browser Forum shortening certificate validity?
The ballot’s main argument is that a certificate describes the state of affairs at the moment of issuance, and the longer it lives, the greater the chance that this state is no longer true. The rationale on the ballot page points to the risk of certificates with outdated content, for example after a domain expires or after the owner loses control of the key.
The second argument concerns revocation. According to the authors of the ballot, CRLs and the OCSP protocol do not adequately protect users at the current scale of the internet, for reasons such as privacy, performance and timeliness of data, while a shorter validity period protects users independently of them. The ballot also recalls that the requirements have always obliged authorities to revoke a certificate within 24 hours in certain circumstances, which assumes that a certificate can be replaced within a day.
The third reason is the transition between cryptographic algorithms. When a weakness appears in an algorithm or a library, shorter validity makes it possible to replace the whole population of certificates more quickly. The authors also name a side benefit: greater maturity of tools for automated certificate issuance and replacement.
Which certificates do the new limits apply to?
The limits apply to publicly trusted TLS server certificates, meaning those whose root certificate is distributed in widely available software. Section 1.1 of the TLS BR states that they address certificates intended to authenticate servers accessible through the internet. That means websites, but also publicly reachable VPN gateways, mail servers, APIs and any other service whose certificate comes from a public authority.
The same section excludes certificates issued by enterprises that operate their own public key infrastructure for internal purposes only, where the root certificate is not distributed by software vendors. An internal certificate authority in an Active Directory domain therefore does not have to apply 47 days, although its policy should be a deliberate decision rather than a default setting.
S/MIME and code signing certificates have separate requirements within the CA/Browser Forum, which this timeline does not change. The details of the protocol that uses server certificates are covered by the SSL/TLS glossary entry.
What happens when a certificate expires unnoticed?
An expired certificate does not weaken encryption; it stops the service, because clients no longer trust the server and abort the connection. A browser shows the user a warning, while applications, scripts and system-to-system integrations usually just report an error and stop working, with no visible message for anyone other than the logs.
Certificates that nobody remembers are easy to miss, because they do not sit on the main website. Email is an example: an MTA-STS policy is fetched over HTTPS from the mta-sts host in the domain, and RFC 8461 requires that host’s certificate to be valid and unexpired. The same applies to certificates installed on devices that terminate encryption before the application: application delivery controllers, web application firewalls and VPN gateways.
With annual certificates, an organisation could live with one oversight a year and a manual fix. With replacements several times a year, and from 2029 at least eight times a year, every manual link becomes a regular source of downtime.
How does automated certificate renewal with ACME work?
ACME is an IETF protocol that lets a server prove control of a domain, obtain a certificate and install it without human involvement. RFC 8555 of March 2019 describes it as a framework for automating domain validation and certificate issuance, allowing servers and infrastructure software to obtain certificates without user interaction.
The ACME client proves control of the domain by completing a task set by the authority. In the http-01 challenge, it places a file with specific content at a given path on the domain’s web server, and in the dns-01 challenge it publishes a TXT record under a name prefixed with _acme-challenge. The DNS challenge does not require a publicly reachable web server, so it works for services without a public website, provided the client can add records with the DNS operator automatically.
According to the RFC, the ACME client periodically contacts the authority to obtain updated certificates and other data the server needs to keep working, and maintaining the certificate requires minimal manual intervention. The RFC’s authors write in the introduction that, in their usability tests, webmasters often needed 1 to 3 hours to obtain and install a certificate, which, with shorter certificates, shows the scale of the work to be automated.
How does the ARI extension help you decide when to renew?
ARI lets a certificate authority suggest to the ACME client when it should renew a certificate, instead of leaving that decision to a fixed rule in the configuration. RFC 9773 of June 2025 describes the ACME Renewal Information extension, in which the ACME server provides a suggested renewal window for a certificate in the suggestedWindow field.
According to the RFC, this lets the server spread load over time, and clients do not make false assumptions about the appropriate renewal period. This matters precisely for short certificates: a “renew 30 days before expiry” rule, sensible at 398 days, would mean renewing just 17 days after issuance at 47 days.
The RFC also gives the example of an authority suggesting renewal ahead of an announced mass revocation of certificates, to limit its impact. A client that regularly asks for the renewal window can then replace the certificate before the revocation stops the service. When you choose an ACME client, it is therefore worth checking whether it supports this extension.
How do you take an inventory of your organisation’s certificates?
An inventory starts with a list of every place where a public certificate is in use, not with a list of orders placed with the issuer. A single certificate is often installed on several devices at once, for example on a web server and on a controller that terminates encryption before the application, and the order says nothing about that.
For each certificate, record the domain names, installation location, business and technical owner, issuing authority, domain validation method, installation method and expiry date. The most important column is the renewal method: automatically via ACME, semi-automatically by script, or manually. Every “manually” entry is an item to change before the next thresholds of the timeline.
Systems that do not support automated certificate installation form a separate group, such as older network devices and applications without an interface for replacing certificates. For them, you need to decide whether a device in front of them can take over the certificate, or whether the system needs an update or replacement.
How do you plan the move to shorter certificates by 2029?
The move is best split into stages that match the thresholds of the timeline, so that each threshold finds the organisation with automation ready for a larger share of its certificates.
| Stage | Maximum validity | Domain validation reuse | What should be working in the organisation | Warning sign |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Until 14 March 2026 | 398 days | 398 days | A certificate inventory with owners | Nobody knows how many certificates the company has |
| 15 March 2026 | 200 days | 200 days | Expiry date monitoring and ACME for web servers | Renewals still driven by calendar reminders |
| 15 March 2027 | 100 days | 100 days | ACME for edge devices, or moving certificates to devices that support it | Certificates installed manually through a device panel |
| 15 March 2029 | 47 days | 10 days | Full automation of domain validation, issuance and installation, ARI support | Domain validation requires a manual DNS change |
The table does not replace the schedule in the requirements; it shows the order of work. If a system cannot be automated before the next threshold, it should go into the risk register with an owner and a decision date.
Key points:
- Since 15 March 2026, a public TLS certificate can be valid for at most 200 days, from 15 March 2027 for 100 days and from 15 March 2029 for 47 days.
- In 2029, domain validation will be reusable for only 10 days, so it must be automated too.
- Internal PKI is not subject to these limits, but every public certificate on a gateway, mail server or API is.
- An inventory with a “renewal method” column is the first step; ACME and ARI come next.
How can nFlo help you prepare your infrastructure for shorter certificates?
nFlo helps put in order the configuration of the systems that certificates run on and of the devices that terminate encrypted traffic. The IT System and Infrastructure Configuration Review service covers operating systems, databases, network devices and cloud configuration against CIS Benchmarks, with a deviation report and prioritised remediation recommendations.
Where a certificate lives on a device in front of the application, that device’s configuration matters. NetScaler (Citrix ADC) combines load balancing, TLS termination and a WAF, and nFlo implements it as a project, from requirements analysis to configuration and team training.
Certificates are always issued by the certificate authority the organisation chooses. If you want to check which systems in your infrastructure may not keep up with the coming thresholds, contact us.
What else is worth knowing about 47-day TLS certificates?
Did a certificate issued before 15 March 2026 lose its validity?
No. The limits in the CA/Browser Forum requirements depend on the date a certificate is issued, not on the date someone checks it. A certificate issued before 15 March 2026 could be valid for up to 398 days and works until the end of the period recorded in its notAfter field.
Does the 47-day limit apply to certificates from an internal certificate authority?
Not directly. The CA/Browser Forum requirements cover publicly trusted TLS server certificates and explicitly exclude public key infrastructure that an enterprise operates for internal purposes only. The validity period of such certificates is set by the organisation’s own policy, although the same renewal automation works well in an internal PKI too.
What do 10 days of domain validation reuse mean?
That from 15 March 2029, when issuing a certificate, a certificate authority can rely only on a check of domain control carried out within the previous 10 days. In practice, domain validation becomes part of almost every renewal, so it should be automated just like issuance itself.
Does ACME work with only one certificate authority?
No. ACME is an open protocol described in RFC 8555, not a single provider’s service. The RFC describes a scenario in which the ACME client presents the administrator with a list of authorities to choose from. Before you deploy it, check whether the authority your organisation uses supports ACME for the certificate type you need.
Where do you start preparing for 47-day certificates?
With an inventory: a list of all public certificates with their installation location, owner, issuing authority and renewal method. Only on that basis can you see which systems can be automated straight away and which need a configuration change or replacement before the next stages of the timeline.
