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Knowledge base Updated: March 1, 2026

LLM Security — enterprise risk assessment framework

LLM risk assessment framework for enterprises — ML supply chain, model poisoning, data leakage, prompt injection, regulatory compliance (EU AI Act, NIS2). Practical guide.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have become an integral part of enterprise technology infrastructure — from customer service automation, through code generation, to legal documentation analysis. However, as adoption grows, so does the attack surface, and traditional IT risk management frameworks do not account for the specific threats associated with AI. This article presents a complete LLM risk assessment framework designed for the needs of CISOs, security architects, and compliance teams in enterprise organizations.

Why do enterprises need a dedicated LLM risk framework?

Deploying LLM models in an enterprise organization is not the same as purchasing a software license. Language models introduce a fundamentally new category of risk that traditional frameworks — ISO 27001, NIST CSF, CIS Controls — do not address sufficiently. Traditional IT security operates on a deterministic basis: inputs produce predictable outputs, vulnerabilities have specific signatures, and system behavior can be fully described by a specification. LLMs break each of these rules.

First, language models are non-deterministic — the same prompt can generate different responses under different conditions. Second, their internal logic is opaque (black box) — even the model’s creators cannot precisely explain why the model generated a specific response. Third, interaction with the model occurs in natural language, meaning that traditional filtering tools (WAF, regex rules, IDS signatures) cannot distinguish malicious input from a normal query.

The scale of LLM deployments in enterprises is growing exponentially. The vast majority of large organizations are planning or have already deployed generative AI-based systems. At the same time, most of them do not have a formal AI security policy. This gap between adoption and safeguards creates an enormous field for exploitation — both by external attackers and through internal risk (unintended data leakage, uncontrolled shadow AI usage).

A dedicated LLM risk framework combines the perspective of technical security (OWASP Top 10 for LLM), organizational risk management (ERM), and regulatory compliance (EU AI Act, NIS2). Without such an integrated approach, organizations either prohibit AI entirely (losing competitive advantage) or deploy it without controls (exposing themselves to serious incidents).

📚 Read the complete guide: AI Security: AI in cybersecurity - threats, defense, the future

The LLM threat landscape — OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications

OWASP (Open Web Application Security Project) published the specialized OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications list, which serves as a reference point for assessing the security of applications based on language models. The 2025 version extends the scope to include threats related to agentic AI systems. Below we present an overview of the most important threat categories in the enterprise context.

LLM01: Prompt Injection — the most serious threat. An attacker manipulates the prompt (directly or indirectly through data processed by the model) to force unauthorized behavior. In the enterprise context, prompt injection can lead to leakage of confidential system data, bypassing access controls, or executing unauthorized actions (if the model has access to tools/APIs).

LLM02: Insecure Output Handling — the model generates output that is directly passed to other systems without validation. In an enterprise pipeline (e.g., a model generating SQL queries, system commands, or code), this can lead to injection attacks on downstream systems.

LLM03: Training Data Poisoning — poisoned training data causes the model to generate incorrect, biased, or malicious results. In an enterprise model that is fine-tuned on company data, attackers can deliberately introduce malicious data into the training corpus.

LLM06: Excessive Agency — a model with access to tools (function calling, API) performs actions beyond its intended scope. In an enterprise environment, where agentic AI systems have increasing privileges, this risk grows exponentially.

LLM07: System Prompt Leakage — disclosure of the system prompt, which contains business logic, security rules, or confidential instructions. In the enterprise context, the system prompt often contains information about system architecture, constraints, and even access credentials.

LLM09: Misinformation — the model generates content that sounds credible but is factually incorrect (hallucinations). In enterprise — where decisions are made based on data — hallucinations can lead to incorrect business decisions, compliance violations, or delivering inaccurate information to clients.

Each of these categories requires dedicated controls that are not covered by standard IT security frameworks. Organizations should treat OWASP Top 10 for LLM as a complement — not a replacement — for existing frameworks (ISO 27001, NIST).

ML supply chain security — model provenance and training data integrity

The ML model supply chain (ML supply chain) is a new attack surface that most organizations completely ignore. In traditional IT, the software supply chain includes libraries, frameworks, and containers — and that alone poses a serious challenge (cf. Log4j, SolarWinds, XZ Utils incidents). In the case of ML/AI, the supply chain is significantly more complex and includes additional layers.

Training data is the foundation of the model. Its quality, completeness, and integrity directly affect model behavior. Poisoned training data (data poisoning) can introduce backdoors into the model that activate under the influence of specific triggers. Contaminating just a tiny fraction of training data is sufficient to introduce a functional backdoor into a language model.

Base models and pre-trained weights are another vector. Organizations using open-source models (Llama, Mistral, Falcon) download model weights from repositories such as Hugging Face. These weights may contain hidden backdoors that are virtually undetectable without advanced analysis. In 2025, cases were identified of malicious models on Hugging Face that contained a reverse shell hidden in the deserialization process.

ML libraries and frameworks (PyTorch, TensorFlow, Transformers) have their own vulnerabilities. Model deserialization (pickle, safetensors) is historically one of the most commonly exploited vectors — a malicious model can execute arbitrary code on the machine that loads it.

API providers (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Azure OpenAI) introduce risks of vendor lock-in, unpredictable changes in model behavior (model updates), and data retention issues — does the provider store prompts and responses, and how are they used?

Recommended controls for the ML supply chain include: verifying model provenance (model cards, training documentation), scanning model weights for known malicious code patterns, isolating fine-tuning environments from production, monitoring model drift (changes in model behavior over time), and formal agreements with API providers specifying security and data retention guarantees.

Model poisoning and adversarial attacks

Model poisoning is a category of attacks in which an adversary manipulates the training or fine-tuning process of a model to influence its behavior. In the enterprise context, this attack vector is particularly dangerous because many organizations apply fine-tuning to models using their own data — and that data may be compromised.

There are three main variants of model poisoning. Data poisoning involves introducing malicious examples into training data. For example: an adversary who has access to the company’s knowledge base (e.g., as an employee or through system compromise) introduces documents containing false information. A model fine-tuned on this data will repeat that false information as fact.

Backdoor attacks are a more sophisticated form of poisoning. The adversary introduces behavior into the model that activates only under the influence of a specific trigger (e.g., a specific phrase in the prompt), while under normal conditions the model behaves correctly. Detection of such a backdoor is extremely difficult because standard tests will not detect anomalies.

Adversarial examples are inputs specially crafted to make the model return an incorrect response. In the case of LLMs, this can be a prompt that looks like a normal question but, due to its specific linguistic construction, causes the model to ignore its security instructions (in practice, this overlaps with prompt injection).

Protection against model poisoning requires a multi-layered approach. Training data verification and sanitization — every document added to the fine-tuning corpus should be checked for integrity and authorization. Model drift monitoring — comparing model responses over time against a reference set allows detection of subtle behavioral changes. Red-teaming and adversarial testing — systematic testing of the model against known attack patterns. Environment isolation — the fine-tuning environment should be separated from production, with access control and change auditing.

Preventing data leakage through LLMs

Data leakage through LLM models is one of the most common and simultaneously most difficult-to-detect threats in the enterprise environment. The problem has three dimensions: data entering the model (input leakage), data extracted from the model (training data extraction), and data generated by the model (output leakage).

Input leakage — employees enter confidential data into the LLM model (via prompt). Cases are well documented: Samsung engineers pasted source code into ChatGPT, financial company employees entered client data, lawyers inserted confidential case documents. In the enterprise context, the risk encompasses personally identifiable information (PII), trade secrets, source code, financial data, and business strategies.

Training data extraction — an attacker extracts fragments of training data from the model. Research has shown that LLMs can reproduce verbatim fragments of data they were trained on — including email addresses, phone numbers, and code fragments. For models fine-tuned on company data, the risk is even higher.

Output leakage — the model generates output containing confidential information based on context (RAG, function calling). For example: a model with access to the company’s knowledge base may reveal confidential information to a user who should not have access to it, if the access control mechanism is not implemented at the retriever level.

Recommended DLP controls for LLMs include: PII and corporate secret filtering on input (input sanitization), data classification and restricting model access to the appropriate confidentiality level, output sandboxing and validation before delivery to the user, monitoring and auditing usage logs (who asked the model what, and when), acceptable use policies with clear guidelines for employees, choosing models with zero-retention guarantees (the provider does not store prompts), and considering dedicated model instances (private deployment) for the most confidential data.

Prompt injection and jailbreaking at enterprise scale

Prompt injection in an enterprise environment is an entirely different problem from jailbreaking ChatGPT by enthusiasts on Reddit. In the corporate context, LLMs have access to internal systems (databases, APIs, tools), meaning that a successful prompt injection can lead to real business consequences: data leakage, unauthorized transactions, or compromise of downstream systems.

Indirect prompt injection is a particularly dangerous variant in enterprise. The model processes data from external sources (emails, documents, websites), and the attacker places hidden instructions in those sources. Example: an attacker sends an email with hidden text (whitespace characters, font size 0) that instructs the email assistant model to forward confidential information to an external address.

Multi-step prompt injection involves a series of seemingly innocent prompts, each of which moves the model closer to unauthorized behavior. No single prompt is malicious, but the sequence leads to a jailbreak. This makes detection difficult — traditional filters analyze prompts individually.

Tool-use exploitation — in agentic systems where the LLM has access to tools (function calling), prompt injection can force the model to invoke tools in an unauthorized manner. For example: a model with access to a payment API could be manipulated to execute a wire transfer.

Enterprise protection against prompt injection requires a defense-in-depth approach. At the input layer: input validation, detection of known injection patterns, rate limiting. At the model layer: robust system prompts, separation of instructions from data, constrained decoding. At the output layer: output validation, human-in-the-loop for critical actions, restricted tool permissions (principle of least privilege). At the monitoring layer: logging of all interactions, anomaly detection on usage patterns, alerts on unusual sequences.

The regulatory landscape — EU AI Act and NIS2 implications for AI

The regulatory environment for AI deployments in Europe is shaped by two key legislative acts: the EU AI Act and the NIS2 Directive. Their combined effect creates a comprehensive compliance framework that organizations deploying LLMs must account for.

EU AI Act — the world’s first comprehensive legislation regulating artificial intelligence. It classifies AI systems according to four risk levels: unacceptable (prohibited), high, limited, and minimal. For LLMs, the key point is that general-purpose AI models (GPAI — General Purpose AI) have a separate category with their own obligations. GPAI providers must provide technical documentation, a copyright compliance policy, and a training data summary.

High-risk AI systems — and LLMs may qualify if used in specific contexts (recruitment, credit scoring, medical diagnostics, law enforcement) — are subject to strict requirements: risk assessment, training data management, transparency, human oversight, resilience to cyberattacks, and registration in the EU database.

NIS2 and AI — the NIS2 Directive does not regulate AI directly, but its requirements have direct implications for LLM deployments. Organizations covered by NIS2 that use AI in critical processes must account for AI threats in their risk assessment (Art. 21), ensure the security of the AI supply chain (model providers, training data, ML infrastructure), report AI-related incidents (if they have a significant impact on services) under the 24h/72h regime, and train the board on AI risks.

Practical implications for organizations. Every LLM deployment should undergo assessment against the EU AI Act (risk classification) and NIS2 (if the organization is a covered entity). This requires collaboration between the CISO, DPO (GDPR), legal department, and AI/ML team. Organizations should establish an AI Governance Board — a multidisciplinary team responsible for overseeing AI deployments in the regulatory context.

Building an enterprise LLM risk management framework

Below we present a practical framework that integrates the perspective of technical security, organizational risk management, and regulatory compliance. The framework is based on five pillars.

Pillar 1: Inventory and classification. The first step is a complete inventory of AI deployments in the organization — both official and shadow AI (tools used by employees without IT’s knowledge). Each deployment should be classified in terms of risk level (EU AI Act), criticality for business processes, type of data processed, and deployment model (API, self-hosted, hybrid).

Pillar 2: Risk assessment. For each LLM deployment, a dedicated risk assessment should be conducted, taking into account technical threats (OWASP Top 10 for LLM), supply chain risks (model providers, data), operational risks (availability, reliability, hallucinations), compliance risks (EU AI Act, NIS2, GDPR), and reputational risks (generating inappropriate content, bias).

We recommend a 5x5 risk matrix (likelihood x impact) with dedicated categories for AI:

RiskLikelihoodImpactScorePriority
Prompt injection (indirect)HighCritical20P1
Data leakage (input)HighHigh16P1
Model hallucinationsHighMedium12P2
Supply chain (model backdoor)LowCritical10P2
Training data poisoningLowHigh8P3
Regulatory non-complianceMediumHigh12P2

Pillar 3: Security controls. Based on the risk assessment, we implement controls across four layers: prevention (input validation, DLP, access control), detection (monitoring, anomaly detection, auditing), response (incident response procedures dedicated to AI incidents), and recovery (model rollback, fallback to a non-AI system).

Pillar 4: Governance and policies. Formalization of AI management in the organization: acceptable use policy for AI/LLM, approval procedure for new AI deployments (AI review board), security standard for vendor assessment (AI providers), training data policy (what can and cannot be used for fine-tuning), and model audit and testing procedures.

Pillar 5: Continuous improvement. The framework must be a living document — regular reviews (quarterly), risk assessment updates after each incident or regulatory change, red-teaming and adversarial testing at least once every six months, and benchmarking against industry standards (NIST AI RMF, ISO/IEC 42001).

How does nFlo support AI security in organizations?

Implementing an LLM security framework is a project requiring interdisciplinary knowledge — at the intersection of cybersecurity, machine learning, regulatory law, and risk management. nFlo combines these competencies within its security audit service, extended with a dedicated AI Security Assessment module.

Our approach encompasses inventory and classification of AI deployments (including shadow AI detection), risk assessment aligned with OWASP Top 10 for LLM and the EU AI Act, penetration testing targeted at LLMs (prompt injection, data extraction, jailbreaking), ML supply chain review, development of AI governance policies, and training for security teams and the board.

With over 200 clients and 500 completed cybersecurity projects, nFlo has the experience to conduct comprehensive AI risk assessments in the context of industry specifics and the regulations to which the organization is subject. Our 98% client retention rate speaks to the quality of services delivered, and the response time set in the contract per incident priority ensures support in crisis situations.

AI security is not an optional add-on — it is a business and regulatory requirement. The sooner an organization builds a formal LLM risk management framework, the better prepared it will be for growing regulatory requirements and evolving threats.

Summary

  • LLMs are a new category of risk — traditional IT security frameworks do not cover the specific threats associated with language models. Organizations need a dedicated approach.
  • OWASP Top 10 for LLM — the reference point for security assessment. Prompt injection, data leakage, and excessive agency are the three most serious enterprise threats.
  • ML supply chain — models, training data, and ML libraries are new attack vectors. Model poisoning and backdoors in open-source models are real threats.
  • Data leakage has three dimensions — input (employees pasting confidential data), extraction (attackers extracting training data), output (model generating confidential information without access control).
  • EU AI Act + NIS2 — two legislative acts create a comprehensive regulatory framework for AI in Europe. Organizations must account for both in their compliance approach.
  • Five-pillar framework — inventory, risk assessment, controls, governance, and continuous improvement. A practical model for AI risk management in enterprise organizations.
  • Act now — the gap between AI adoption and safeguards is growing. The sooner an organization implements a formal framework, the lower the risk of incidents and regulatory violations.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is supply chain risk in the context of LLM models?

LLM supply chain risk includes: poisoned training data, backdoors in open-source models, malicious fine-tuning, vulnerabilities in ML libraries (PyTorch, TensorFlow), and risks associated with API providers (vendor lock-in, data retention policies).

How does the EU AI Act affect LLM deployments in a company?

The EU AI Act classifies AI systems by risk level. LLMs may fall under “high-risk” if used in recruitment, credit scoring, or medical diagnostics. This requires: risk assessment, technical documentation, human oversight, and registration in the EU database.

What is model poisoning and how can you protect against it?

Model poisoning is an attack in which an adversary manipulates training data so the model generates incorrect or malicious outputs. Protection includes: verifying data sources, monitoring model drift, red-teaming, and isolating fine-tuning environments.

How can you prevent data leakage through LLMs?

Key safeguards: input DLP (filtering PII/corporate secrets in prompts), output sandboxing, usage log monitoring, acceptable use policies, choosing models with data retention guarantees (e.g., zero-retention API), and dedicated model instances.


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