An administrator enables NTLM auditing on a domain controller just to see how big the problem is. A week later the log shows a scanner in accounting that saves files to a server addressed by IP, an HR system bought years ago and a service account whose owner nobody remembers. Each of these connections works, so nobody ever reported it. Each of them uses a protocol that Microsoft is officially retiring.
For an IT director this is not a matter of configuration hygiene but of the whole domain’s cybersecurity. NTLM is vulnerable to authentication relay and brute-force attacks, and its oldest version is disappearing from successive Windows releases. If you know the list of dependencies, you can switch NTLM off in stages and without downtime. If you do not, you learn it on the day an update changes the system’s default behaviour and staff can no longer sign in to Wi-Fi or VPN automatically.
What does NTLM deprecation mean and what exactly did Microsoft announce?
NTLM deprecation means that Microsoft has stopped developing every version of the protocol but, apart from NTLMv1, has not removed them. NTLM has been on the list of deprecated features in the Windows client since June 2024, together with LANMAN, NTLMv1 and NTLMv2. Microsoft wrote there that NTLM will continue to work in the next release of Windows Server and the next annual release of Windows, and that calls to NTLM should be replaced by calls to Negotiate.
Negotiate first tries to authenticate the user with Kerberos and falls back to NTLM only when necessary. An application that calls NTLM directly never gives Kerberos a chance.
In November 2024 Microsoft added to that entry: NTLMv1 is removed starting with Windows 11, version 24H2, and Windows Server 2025. The page on features removed or no longer developed in Windows Server adds that NTLMv2 continues to work but will be removed from Windows Server in a future release. The page gives no date for that step.
Key takeaways:
- All versions of NTLM have been deprecated since June 2024: they are not developed, but they work.
- NTLMv1 has been removed from Windows 11 24H2 and Windows Server 2025.
- NTLMv2 is due to disappear from Windows Server in a future release, with no date given.
- Applications should call Negotiate, not NTLM directly.
Why does NTLM still run in your domain when Kerberos is the default?
NTLM runs because Windows reaches for it wherever Kerberos cannot be used. According to the NTLM overview in Microsoft’s documentation, Kerberos version 5 is the preferred authentication method for Active Directory environments, but NTLM is still required for computers in a workgroup and for local logon on machines that are not domain controllers. Applications, including Microsoft’s own, may still use it.
The description of the Network security: LAN Manager authentication level policy adds joining a computer to a domain, authentication between Active Directory forests and logons to computers outside the domain and to systems that do not run Windows.
Kerberos also requires the client to address the service by name and the service to have a registered SPN. The ticket exchange is covered in the article on the Kerberos protocol. Here a practical rule is enough: when either condition is missing, Negotiate silently falls back to NTLM and the user notices nothing.
What is the risk of leaving NTLM on your corporate network?
Left unchecked, NTLM gives an attacker a way to use someone else’s authentication without knowing the password. In the description of the Restrict NTLM: Audit NTLM authentication in this domain policy, Microsoft states that NTLM and NTLMv2 authentication is vulnerable to various malicious attacks, including SMB relay, man-in-the-middle and brute-force attacks.
In practice there are two scenarios. In the first, the attacker tricks the victim’s computer into authenticating to the attacker’s server and relays that attempt to a server where the victim has permissions. In the second, the attacker uses the password hash instead of the password itself; the glossary entry on pass-the-hash describes this technique. The documentation on blocking NTLM in the SMB client says the block prevents attackers from tricking clients into sending NTLM requests to malicious servers and counters brute-force, cracking and pass-the-hash attacks.
The audit itself is a risk too: it records in the logs which devices handle this traffic, and such a list is useful to an attacker as well. Microsoft therefore recommends restricting access to the log files when the audit runs in production.
What changes for NTLMv1 in October 2026?
For October 2026 Microsoft planned a change to the default behaviour of Windows: attempts to use NTLMv1-derived credentials for single sign-on are to be blocked rather than just recorded. The timeline is set out in support article KB5066470, published on 29 August 2025. It applies to Windows 11 24H2 and Windows Server 2025, from which the NTLMv1 protocol itself has already been removed.
So where is the problem? According to Microsoft, remnants of NTLMv1 cryptography are still present in some scenarios, for example with MS-CHAPv2 authentication in a domain-joined environment. This means Wi-Fi, Ethernet and VPN networks that sign users in automatically. In Enforce mode single sign-on to these networks stops working, but entering credentials manually still works.
The switch is the BlockNtlmv1SSO registry value under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\MSV1_0: 0 means Audit mode, 1 means Enforce mode. In Audit mode the Microsoft-Windows-NTLM/Operational log records event 4024 whenever such credentials are used, and in Enforce mode event 4025 marks a block. The new default will only apply to devices where the key has not been deployed. Devices with Credential Guard enabled are not affected, because according to Microsoft that feature fully protects against legacy NTLMv1 cryptography.
Before the default changes, review the 4024 events. An empty list lets you set BlockNtlmv1SSO to 1 straight away, and every entry on it is a network or device to move to another authentication method before an update does it for you.
How do you find out who in your domain uses NTLM?
Start with three audit policies that record NTLM traffic without blocking anything. Microsoft describes them in the Auditing and restricting NTLM usage guide and in the descriptions of the policies themselves:
- on domain controllers: Network security: Restrict NTLM: Audit NTLM authentication in this domain set to “Enable all”;
- on servers: Restrict NTLM: Audit incoming NTLM traffic set to “Enable auditing for all accounts”;
- on workstations and servers: Restrict NTLM: Outgoing NTLM traffic to remote servers set to “Audit all”, which logs an event for every NTLM request to a remote server.
All three sit under Security Options in the local policies. The change takes effect without a restart, and the events go to the Applications and Services Logs\Microsoft\Windows\NTLM log. An audit policy behaves like its blocking counterpart, except that it blocks nothing. It therefore shows what would stop working before anything does.
Enable the domain policy on all domain controllers with a single Group Policy Object, because according to Microsoft a controller logs only the authentication traffic sent to that controller itself. Check the log size regularly and collect the events centrally, for example in a SIEM system. Warn the board too that, according to Microsoft, the analysis could span months depending on the complexity of your deployment.
How do you read NTLM events 8001, 8003 and 8004?
Read them from the domain controller towards the client, because each event points to the next machine to check. Microsoft’s Viewing events for assessing NTLM usage document describes this order:
- 8004 on the domain controller gives the account, domain, workstation and the “Secure Channel name” field, that is, the member server the client connected to.
- 8003 on that server includes, among other things, the process identifier. PID 4 means the SYSTEM process, that is, traffic from kernel mode, and sends you to event 8001 on the client workstation.
- 8001 on the client computer shows the target server, the name of the process that sent the request and the identity that process supplied.
The most valuable field is the target server in event 8001. Microsoft states plainly that if it is not in NetBIOS or fully qualified domain name (FQDN) format, Kerberos will not be used. An IP address in this field is a ready diagnosis: replace it with the server’s name.
SMB traffic is harder, because the events then show only PID 4 and the computer, not the application. Microsoft recommends Process Monitor to match client and server timestamps to a specific program. Event 8004 may also not appear at all when a local account connects to a file server.
The easiest way to check the protocol version is event 4624: for the NTLM package, the “Package Name (NTLM only)” field states the version, for example NTLM V1. Microsoft’s article on auditing NTLMv1 on a domain controller advises ignoring such entries for ANONYMOUS LOGON, because the audit marks them as NTLMv1 even without key material.
Why does an application choose NTLM even though it supports Kerberos?
Because something in its configuration prevents Kerberos, and Negotiate silently picks NTLM. Microsoft tells you to expect NTLM even in applications that theoretically support Kerberos and lists four groups:
- applications that allow various security configurations and providers;
- applications without correctly configured SPNs;
- applications that connect by IP address instead of DNS name, because of misconfiguration or vendor documentation;
- applications with a legacy code base in which some parts support only NTLM.
Each group needs a different fix. In the first, it is enough to change the application’s authentication setting to Negotiate or Kerberos. In the second, you register the missing SPN and tidy up the service accounts while you are at it; this is a good moment to move them to gMSA accounts without static passwords. In the third, you replace the address with a name and, for a DNS alias, register an SPN for the alias too.
In the fourth, the vendor decides: either it releases a version that calls Negotiate, or the application goes on the exception list with a review date and a business owner. An exception without a date turns into a permanent back door.
How do you restrict NTLM without stopping the business?
The safe order is audit, exceptions, audit again and only then block. Microsoft describes it under the Restrict NTLM: Add server exceptions in this domain policy: first audit and review the log, then build the server exception list, review the log again and only then block.
The exception list takes NetBIOS server names, one per line, and a single asterisk works as a wildcard. Without it, enabling the block in the “Restrict NTLM: NTLM authentication in this domain” policy makes every NTLM authentication attempt in the domain fail. The policy has separate deny options for domain accounts and domain servers, so you can enable the block step by step.
On the client side the pair “Outgoing NTLM traffic to remote servers” set to “Deny all” and “Add remote server exceptions for NTLM authentication” works in a similar way. In the description of the outgoing traffic policy, Microsoft warns that changing it may affect compatibility with client computers, services and applications, and recommends starting with “Audit all”.
Windows Server 2025 and Windows 11 24H2 offer a narrower tool: the SMB client can block NTLM for remote outbound connections, through the “Block NTLM (LM, NTLM, NTLMv2)” policy or the Set-SmbClientConfiguration -BlockNTLM $true command, with exceptions, for example for an SMB server outside the domain. According to Microsoft, organisations can enable this protection without disabling NTLM entirely.
What has Microsoft announced to replace NTLM?
In October 2023 Microsoft described on the Windows IT Pro Blog two new Kerberos features for Windows 11 intended to remove the main reasons for falling back to NTLM. IAKerb lets a client without direct line of sight to a domain controller authenticate with Kerberos, and a local Key Distribution Center (local KDC) adds Kerberos for local accounts. In the same announcement Microsoft wrote that reducing NTLM will culminate in disabling it in Windows 11, without giving a date.
The Windows Server page on removed features links to that announcement and confirms that NTLMv2 will be removed in a future release. So there is no point waiting for a date: a dependency found early does not need firefighting on the day the default changes, as it does for NTLMv1 in October 2026.
Moving to Kerberos has its own conditions as well. According to what’s new in Windows Server 2025, the Key Distribution Center in that version no longer issues Ticket Granting Tickets using RC4 encryption. An application you move off NTLM is therefore worth checking for AES support straight away.
How do you plan the move from NTLM to Kerberos?
Build the plan by traffic source rather than by server, because a single cause, such as an IP address in a configuration, repeats across many machines.
| Source of NTLM traffic | How to recognise it | What to change | When an exception makes sense | Evidence of closure |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Connection by IP address | 8001: target server shown as an IP address | DNS name, SPN for the alias | Only until the configuration changes | No new 8001 events for that address |
| Service without an SPN | 8003 for the service account | SPN registration, gMSA account | Vendor does not support Kerberos | No 8003 for the service in the next audit |
| Local account or workgroup | 8003 without a matching 8004 | Domain account or joining the domain | A machine that cannot be joined | Exception with an owner |
| Non-Windows device | 8003 or 8004 with the device name | Firmware with Kerberos support | No such support from the vendor | Exception with a review date |
| SMB traffic from kernel mode | 8003 with PID 4 | Process Monitor, then as above | Depends on the application | Application identified and decision taken |
| NTLMv1 and MS-CHAPv2 | 4624 with “NTLM V1”, 4024 events | LMCompatibilityLevel = 5, BlockNtlmv1SSO = 1 | Temporarily, until the sign-in method changes | No 4024 events |
| Application with NTLM in its code | 8001 with the process name despite name and SPN | Version that calls Negotiate | Until the application’s end of life | Date from the vendor |
According to Microsoft, an LMCompatibilityLevel value of 5 is the configuration in which the domain controller accepts only NTLMv2. The administrator can close the first two rows alone, while the last two need business decisions and deadlines.
How can nFlo help you restrict NTLM?
NTLM is one element of a wider picture: Kerberos configuration, delegations, permissions and the paths by which an attacker reaches domain administrator rights. That picture is what the Active Directory Security Audit run by nFlo provides. We analyse Kerberos configuration, delegations, group membership and attack paths with BloodHound, PingCastle and Purple Knight, which operate in read-only mode. The result is an attack path map and a prioritised hardening plan that covers, among other things, Kerberos hardening and monitoring.
The list of NTLM dependencies from the event audit shows which Kerberos configuration changes will unblock switching NTLM off. You will find more articles on identity and privileged access in the identity and PAM knowledge base. If you would like to discuss the audit scope for your domain, contact us.
What else is worth knowing about NTLM deprecation?
Will NTLM stop working as soon as it is deprecated?
No. Microsoft announced that NTLM will keep working in the next release of Windows Server and Windows. So far only NTLMv1 has been removed, and NTLMv2 is due to be removed from Windows Server in a future release.
Can enabling NTLM auditing break anything?
No, the audit policies block nothing and take effect without a restart. You only need to watch the log size and restrict access to the log.
What is BlockNtlmv1SSO?
It is a registry value: 0 means Audit mode, 1 means blocking NTLMv1-derived credentials for single sign-on. For October 2026 Microsoft planned a default of 1 wherever the key has not been deployed.
Can you block NTLM for SMB shares only?
Yes, in Windows Server 2025 and Windows 11 24H2 the SMB client can block NTLM for outbound connections, with an exception list.
On how many domain controllers do you need to enable NTLM auditing?
On all of them, because a domain controller with the policy enabled logs only the traffic sent to that controller itself.
