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Expired Secure Boot certificates from 2011: what to check on servers and laptops after June and October 2026

Three Secure Boot certificates issued by Microsoft in 2011 expired in June and October 2026. A device without the 2023 certificates still starts, but it no longer receives new early-boot protections or boot manager fixes.

Secure Boot certificate expiration became a fact in 2026: three certificates that Microsoft issued for Secure Boot in 2011 expired, two in June and the third on 19 October. According to Microsoft’s article on the expiration of Secure Boot certificates, this affects every Windows device that carries the 2011 versions of the certificates in its firmware, including servers running Windows Server 2016 to 2025.

A server or laptop without the new 2023 certificates still boots. What it has lost is access to new protections for the earliest stage of boot, before the operating system and security tools begin to run. From a cybersecurity point of view this is a particularly insidious change: the device looks healthy, while its protection against malicious code that runs before the operating system stands still. Checking the fleet and deploying the new certificates is therefore work for the IT department that waiting for updates alone will not replace.

What is Secure Boot and what are its certificates for?

Secure Boot is a security feature of UEFI firmware that allows only trusted software to run while a device starts up. Microsoft describes how the firmware checks the digital signature of pre-boot software against a set of trusted certificates, also known as certificate authorities (CAs), stored in the firmware.

Microsoft introduced Secure Boot support in Windows 8 as protection against malicious code that runs before the operating system, known as bootkits. The firmware verifies UEFI modules, drivers such as the Option ROMs of expansion cards, and the boot loader in turn. Only a trusted boot loader receives control and starts Windows. Secure Boot does not encrypt data and does not replace anti-malware protection: it only makes sure that nothing but signed boot code reaches memory at start-up.

A hierarchy of keys decides what is trusted. At the top sits the Platform Key (PK), typically owned by the hardware manufacturer. Below it is the KEK, which allows the signature databases to be changed. The DB holds the allowed certificates and the DBX the list of revoked signatures, which Microsoft updates with new revocations. According to Microsoft, any entity with a KEK can update the DB and DBX. Replacement therefore needs two things: a new KEK that can sign future database changes once the old one has expired, and new entries in the DB so that the firmware trusts boot loaders signed with the 2023 certificates.

Which 2011 Secure Boot certificates expired in 2026?

Three Microsoft certificates expired, and each has a 2023 successor. The table in Microsoft’s article, updated on 18 May 2026 with the exact days, gives the following dates:

  • Microsoft Corporation KEK CA 2011 expired on 24 June 2026. Successor: Microsoft Corporation KEK 2K CA 2023, stored in the KEK, which signs updates to the DB and DBX.
  • Microsoft UEFI CA 2011 expired on 27 June 2026. Successors: Microsoft UEFI CA 2023 for third-party boot loaders and EFI applications, and Microsoft Option ROM UEFI CA 2023 for third-party Option ROMs.
  • Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011 expired on 19 October 2026. Successor: Windows UEFI CA 2023, stored in the DB, which signs the Windows boot loader.

Splitting the old UEFI CA 2011 into two certificates has a practical purpose. Microsoft explains that a system which needs to trust Option ROMs can add the Option ROM certificate without also trusting third-party boot loaders. Microsoft also notes that both the DB and the KEK need to be updated with the new versions.

Key points:

  • KEK CA 2011 expired on 24 June, UEFI CA 2011 on 27 June and Windows Production PCA 2011 on 19 October 2026.
  • A device without the 2023 certificates starts normally but receives no new early-boot protections.
  • Since October 2026, Windows boot loader fixes have been signed exclusively with the Windows UEFI CA 2023 chain.
  • Deploy the certificates in stages, starting with a representative sample of hardware.

What happens to a device that has not received the 2023 certificates?

A device without the 2023 certificates still starts, runs and installs standard Windows updates. Microsoft writes, however, that such devices can no longer receive new security protections for the early boot process: updates to Windows Boot Manager, the Secure Boot databases, revocation lists or mitigations for newly discovered boot-level vulnerabilities.

The effect grows over time. Every new vulnerability in the boot loader for which Microsoft releases a fix signed with the new certificate stays open on such a device. Microsoft points out that this may affect scenarios that rely on Secure Boot trust, such as BitLocker hardening or third-party boot loaders.

For the IT department the key point is that the problem shows no symptoms. A server that has not received the new certificates reports no error at start-up and looks no different from a healthy one in ordinary availability monitoring. Only a check of the certificates or the event log reveals its state.

In practice the risk concerns above all servers that a company keeps for years without replacing the hardware, and laptops with outdated firmware. An attacker who exploits a boot loader vulnerability operates below the operating system, so security tools that start together with Windows may not notice. For this reason Secure Boot and the currency of its databases belong on the same checklist as operating system patches and endpoint protection.

Why did the expiry of Windows Production PCA 2011 change how the boot loader is patched?

Since 19 October 2026, fixes for the Windows boot loader have been signed only with the new certificate. In KB5132953 of 22 October 2026, Microsoft wrote that all subsequent security patches for the Windows boot loader are signed exclusively with the Windows UEFI CA 2023 certificate chain.

According to Microsoft, the final Windows Boot Manager releases signed with the 2011 certificate have been frozen across all supported Windows servicing branches and will not receive further fixes. The same document confirms that the expiration itself does not cause computers to stop turning on and does not prevent Windows from starting.

In KB5132953 (as of mid-November 2026) Microsoft announced that a future installation media release will boot by default with the 2023-signed boot loader, while the frozen 2011 version stays on the media. For systems that need it, the vendor announced a script to switch booting back to the older version. Organisations that install servers from their own images should therefore check whether their media will start on hardware with the new certificates.

How do you check whether Secure Boot is enabled and whether a device has the new certificates?

First you need to confirm that Secure Boot is enabled at all. In its guidance for IT professionals, Microsoft gives the PowerShell command Confirm-SecureBootUEFI, run with administrator rights. A result of True means the feature is on. On a single computer the same state is visible in the Windows Security app, in the device security section.

Events in the system log show the state of the certificates. According to Microsoft, event 1801 is an error indicating that the updated certificates have not been applied, and it contains device attributes that help identify which machines still need the update. Event 1808 is an informational event indicating that the device has the required new certificates in its firmware.

In a larger fleet the check has to be run by the device management tool. Microsoft gives the example of a compliance script in Intune and a sample PowerShell script for inventorying Secure Boot status. In practice it is worth comparing the result with the list of servers in the racks, because machines outside the management system will not appear in the report.

How does Windows deploy the new certificates on a device?

Windows deploys the certificates through a scheduled task, and the IT department decides which devices receive them. Microsoft announced in KB5062710 that it would manage the update of the new certificates itself on a significant portion of Windows devices, and that it would provide detailed guidance to organisations that manage their own updates. In KB5132953 it added that a user of a personal computer updated automatically through Windows Update does not need to take the actions described there. Company laptops in a management console and servers with a controlled update schedule belong to the second group.

In such an environment, targeting a device for the update sets a value on it, and a task that, according to Microsoft’s deployment guidance, runs every 12 hours detects the change and starts the deployment. The order is fixed. First the task adds the Windows UEFI CA 2023 certificate to the DB. If the DB contained Microsoft UEFI CA 2011, it also adds Microsoft Option ROM UEFI CA 2023 and Microsoft UEFI CA 2023. Next it adds Microsoft Corporation KEK 2K CA 2023. Finally it replaces Windows Boot Manager with the version signed with the new certificate, and this last step waits for a restart, for example after the monthly updates.

The wait for a restart matters for servers. A machine that has not been restarted for weeks may already have the new certificates in its firmware but still run the old boot manager. The deployment plan should therefore include maintenance windows with a restart.

What role do server manufacturers and firmware play in this change?

Hardware manufacturers are responsible for the firmware in which the certificates are stored, and some of them release firmware updates needed for the change. Microsoft writes that many OEMs provide firmware updates when needed, and on its page of links to OEM pages it lists materials from Lenovo, HPE and Dell, among others.

In its Secure Boot CA 2023 Guide for Azure Local and Windows Server, Lenovo describes the transition of Windows Server environments from the CA 2011 to the CA 2023 certificates, including minimum Lenovo UEFI firmware levels and recovery scenarios. Among them are missing CA 2023 keys in the DB after a firmware update, recovery media that fails to boot, and a BitLocker recovery key prompt after a Secure Boot key update. For HPE and Dell servers, the manufacturers’ materials are available through the same Microsoft page.

The wider context of firmware security, meaning BMC controllers, hardware root of trust and the relationship between Secure Boot and the TPM, is covered in the article on server firmware security. Secure Boot certificates are one element of this chain of trust, not the whole chain.

How do you prepare the rollout so that servers still boot?

Run the rollout in stages, on a sample of hardware, with recovery keys at hand. Microsoft recommends that instead of deploying Secure Boot updates all at once, you start with a small group of devices, check the results and then expand. The sample is built by manufacturer, model, BIOS version and date and baseboard version, parameters available in the system information tool.

Before the first stage it is worth checking three things. First, whether the BitLocker recovery keys of servers and laptops are stored somewhere accessible without a running system, given that Lenovo describes a key prompt after a Secure Boot key update. Second, whether the manufacturer requires newer firmware for a given model. Third, whether recovery media and images will start on a device with the new certificates.

Virtual machines are a separate case. In March 2026 Microsoft resolved a known issue with certificate updates on Hyper-V virtual machines, reported as event 1795, and it maintains separate pages for machines in Azure. In practice it is worth checking virtual machine templates and their Secure Boot settings in the same way as physical servers.

How should you split the work between the IT department and the hardware vendor?

The split follows from where the certificate lives and who can change it. The IT department runs almost every stage; the hardware vendor steps in where the change needs new firmware.

StageWhat to checkTool or sourceWho is responsible
Secure Boot stateWhether the feature is enabledConfirm-SecureBootUEFI, Windows Security appIT department
InventoryManufacturer, model, BIOS version and date of devicesSystem information, Microsoft’s inventory scriptIT department
FirmwareWhether the model requires newer firmwareManufacturer pages (Lenovo, HPE, Dell) listed by MicrosoftHardware manufacturer, deployment: IT department
SampleDeployment on a small group and a check of the resultEvents 1801 and 1808IT department
RecoveryBitLocker keys and boot mediaKey backup, media testIT department
Wider rolloutFurther device groups and restartsWindows scheduled task, maintenance windowsIT department

The vendor appears in the table once, but its row can hold up all the others: without its firmware update some models will not accept the new certificates.

How can nFlo help you check Secure Boot on your servers?

nFlo runs the IT System and Infrastructure Configuration Review, a technical audit of servers, networks, storage and Active Directory against CIS Benchmarks and vendor best practices, ending with a report of deviations and hardening guidance. Such a review is an opportunity to compare the Secure Boot state with the rest of the server configuration.

nFlo’s portfolio also includes Lenovo ThinkSystem Servers with the XClarity controller, a hardware root of trust with Platform Firmware Resiliency, TPM 2.0 and Secure Boot, and HPE ProLiant Servers with iLO remote management. Firmware and certificate updates for these servers are released by their manufacturers. If you want to check which servers in your organisation need attention, contact us.

What else should you know about Secure Boot certificates?

Will a computer without the 2023 Secure Boot certificates stop starting?

No. Microsoft writes that devices without the new certificates continue to start and operate normally, and standard Windows updates continue to install. They do not, however, receive new protections for the early boot process.

Does turning Secure Boot off solve the expired certificate problem?

No. Turning Secure Boot off removes the protection against malicious code that runs before the operating system, which is the very protection the certificates exist for. The right step is to deploy the 2023 certificates and, where the manufacturer requires it, update the firmware.

How do you check whether Secure Boot is enabled on a Windows server?

Microsoft gives the PowerShell command Confirm-SecureBootUEFI, run with administrator rights. A returned value of True means Secure Boot is enabled.

Which event log entry shows that the certificates have been applied?

According to Microsoft, event ID 1808 reports that the device has the required new Secure Boot certificates in its firmware, while event 1801 means the certificates have not been applied yet.

Should you secure BitLocker recovery keys before updating the certificates?

It is advisable. Microsoft lists BitLocker among the scenarios that rely on Secure Boot trust, and Lenovo describes in its guide a scenario in which a BitLocker recovery key prompt appears after a Secure Boot key update.

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