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Cybersecurity due diligence: how to check a company's security before an acquisition

The deal is due to be signed in three weeks, and the data room holds a security policy, a certificate and the sentence "no significant incidents recorded". Cybersecurity due diligence means separating assurances from evidence, and the ICO fine against Marriott concerned what happened after the acquisition.

The acquisition agreement is due to be signed in three weeks. The data room holds a security policy, a management system certificate and the IT department’s answer to the question about incidents: “no significant events recorded”. Nobody has asked who at the company reviews the logs of administrator accounts, or whether anyone has done so in the past year.

This is what due diligence based on declarations looks like. In cybersecurity, acquiring a company means acquiring its systems together with a history the buyer does not know. The seller’s declaration will not reveal that history; documents and the state of the systems will.

What is cybersecurity due diligence and how does it differ from a security audit?

Cybersecurity due diligence is a review of the target company’s systems, data and security practices that the buyer carries out before signing, to know what it is paying for and what it is taking on. It differs from a security audit in purpose and working conditions. An audit is commissioned by the owner of the systems, who wants to improve them and opens them to the auditor. Due diligence is commissioned by the buyer, who sees only what the seller agrees to show.

The outcome differs too. An audit ends with a remediation plan for the owner. Cybersecurity due diligence ends with a list of findings and unknowns, each of which has to land in one of four places: the price, the contract terms, the closing conditions or the post-acquisition action plan. A finding that lands nowhere is simply inherited by the buyer.

The most dangerous problems do not sit in documents: a company with a current policy and a certificate may be hosting an undetected attacker on its network. Good cybersecurity due diligence therefore assumes that some answers will only come after closing, and plans how to obtain them.

Why does the buyer also take on incidents from before the deal?

The buyer takes on the systems together with their history, including intrusions that began before the deal and are still going on. A well-documented example is Marriott International’s acquisition of the Starwood hotel group, described in the decision of the UK data protection authority, the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), of 30 October 2020.

According to that decision, the attacker installed a web shell, a script that gives remote access through a web server, on a device in the Starwood network on 29 July 2014. Marriott acquired Starwood in September 2016 and did not detect the attack until September 2018. The attack only came to light when the attacker triggered an alert on a table in the reservation database that contained payment card data.

According to the ICO decision of 2020, Marriott estimated that the attack affected 339 million guest records, including 30.1 million from the European Economic Area. All of these records passed to the new owner’s responsibility together with systems in which the attacker was still present.

What did the ICO fine Marriott for, and what did it not assess?

The ICO fined Marriott £18.4 million for failing to put appropriate security in place on the acquired Starwood systems in the period from 25 May 2018, when the GDPR began to apply, to 17 September 2018. The legal basis was Article 5(1)(f) and Article 32 GDPR, which require data to be protected with appropriate technical and organisational measures.

The decision lists four principal failures: insufficient monitoring of privileged accounts, insufficient monitoring of databases, a lack of control over critical systems and incomplete encryption. For the third, the ICO points to server hardening, for example access whitelisting. For the fourth, it notes that Marriott encrypted card data and some passport numbers with AES-128, but in keeping with its focus on PCI DSS did not encrypt other categories of data.

What the ICO did not assess matters just as much. In paragraph 3.3 of the decision, the authority states that it makes no finding about the period between the acquisition and the date the GDPR began to apply, and does not determine whether Marriott could have carried out due diligence during the takeover. It adds that there may be circumstances in which in-depth due diligence of a competitor during a takeover is not possible.

So the fine did not concern how the deal was run. It concerned what the buyer failed to do with the acquired systems once it was already responsible for the data processed in them. The same decision states that in July 2019 the ICO proposed a fine of £99.2 million, and that it reduced the final amount in light of, among other things, mitigating factors and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Key takeaways:

  • Limited due diligence before signing does not reduce the buyer’s obligations after closing.
  • The failures listed in the decision make a ready-made checklist: privileged accounts, database monitoring, system hardening, encryption.

Which documents should you check before signing?

Before signing, it is worth requesting documents that show how the company really manages security: breach records, an inventory of systems and privileged accounts, test reports with remediation status, contracts with IT suppliers and evidence of risk management. Start with the ones the law requires, because they should exist.

The first item is the record of personal data breaches. Article 33(5) GDPR requires the controller to document any personal data breach, including the facts relating to it, its effects and the remedial action taken (as of 18 November 2026). Missing records, or a statement that “there have been no breaches”, are a reason for further questions, not for relief.

If the company is an essential or important entity under the NIS2 Directive, ask for its policies on risk analysis and information system security and for the procedures used to assess the effectiveness of risk-management measures. Article 21(2)(a) and (f) NIS2 lists them among the measures such entities must put in place (as of 18 November 2026). In a financial entity, the map of dependencies comes from the register of information on contractual arrangements with ICT third-party service providers, maintained under Article 28(3) DORA.

Without the remaining documents, risk is hard to assess: an inventory of systems holding personal data, a list of administrator accounts, penetration test reports with open vulnerabilities, restore test results and contracts with suppliers that have remote access.

How do you tell a seller’s assurance from evidence?

An assurance is an answer to a question, a document is a trace of a process, and evidence is the state of a system that can be checked. For every significant area, cybersecurity due diligence should establish which of these three levels the buyer’s knowledge rests on, because that determines how much risk remains after signing.

An assurance sounds like this: “multi-factor authentication covers all administrator accounts”. A document is the policy that requires it, or an auditor’s report that confirmed it. Evidence is a configuration export with the list of accounts, showing that no account with access to a critical system bypasses the second factor.

The ICO decision shows why this difference matters. Marriott believed that multi-factor authentication protected access to the cardholder data environment, because Starwood’s management had assured it of this and two reports by independent PCI DSS assessors, dated 29 April 2016 and 23 May 2017, had confirmed it. In reality, the control did not cover all accounts with access to that environment, and the attacker exploited the gap. The ICO accepted that Marriott was entitled to rely on the reports and did not fine it for this gap.

For the buyer this is cold comfort, because the absence of a fine did not stop the attacker. If the price or the integration depends on the result, you need technical evidence or a contract clause that sets out who bears the consequences of a false assurance.

When does cybersecurity due diligence need technical testing?

Technical tests are needed when the price or terms of the deal depend on the state of the systems and documents are not enough, for example when the target’s infrastructure is to be connected to the buyer’s network. Every such test requires the target company’s consent and a scope agreed in writing, because before closing the buyer does not own the systems.

Before signing, low-impact tests work best. A configuration review needs read-only access and compares the settings of servers, databases, network devices and cloud services against a standard such as the CIS Benchmarks. A compromise assessment reviews logs, accounts and endpoints for signs of an attacker’s presence, so it looks for exactly what nobody found in the Starwood network between July 2014 and September 2018.

A full penetration test before signing can be hard to agree, because sellers are reluctant to allow a simulated attack ahead of a deal that may not go through. In that case, it is worth scheduling it right after closing and setting aside part of the integration budget for fixes. Methods of actively searching for an attacker’s traces are covered in the article on what threat hunting is.

How do due diligence findings affect the price and the contract?

Every cybersecurity due diligence finding requires a decision, and the options are the same four ways of treating risk as in any other process: acceptance, avoidance, mitigation and transfer. They are described in the article on risk mitigation strategies and the four risk treatment options, and in a transaction each of them has its counterpart.

Acceptance means the buyer knows the risk, does not remove it and reflects it in the price, for example by taking over a system without vendor support at a lower valuation. Avoidance means giving up the activity that is the source of the risk: excluding from integration a system that is due to be retired or, in the extreme case, walking away from the deal. Mitigation means remediation, either before closing as a condition of closing or after closing under an agreed plan.

Transfer means contract terms that shift the financial consequences to the seller, such as representations and warranties backed by the seller’s liability, part of the price paid later, or transaction insurance. According to NIST SP 800-39 of 2011, risk transfer reduces neither the likelihood of an event nor its consequences. Money from the seller will not undo a data leak.

The form of these terms is set by the transaction lawyer, and the security team provides the findings: what was established, what the consequences could be and what remediation costs.

What should you do with the acquired systems from the first day after closing?

From the first day after closing, the buyer is responsible for the security of the acquired systems, so the plan for that day is drawn up during due diligence. Its minimum is set by the failures in the ICO decision: monitoring of privileged accounts, alerts on all tables with personal data, hardening of systems holding sensitive data and encryption of all sensitive categories of data.

The first actions are cheap: changing passwords and keys for administrator accounts (and, where the compromise assessment has not ruled out the attacker’s presence, cutting the attacker off first and only then resetting), reviewing supplier and former employee accounts, collecting logs in the buyer’s tools. At Starwood, the alert that exposed the attack covered only tables with card data, so exporting the other tables could not raise an alarm.

It is worth postponing network integration until verification is complete. Marriott kept the two companies’ networks separate and, according to the ICO, as a result the attacker did not gain access to the wider Marriott network. Separation limited the impact, but did not replace security controls within the Starwood network itself.

Systems due to be retired are a separate trap. Marriott planned to decommission the Starwood network in the first quarter of 2018, and the schedule slipped to the end of the year. The ICO found that the planned retirement did not remove the obligation to secure a system in which data was still being processed. A system “to be switched off in a few months” needs security controls for the entire transition period.

Who on the buyer’s side is responsible for the due diligence findings?

The buyer’s board is responsible for the cybersecurity due diligence findings, because it decides on the deal and accepts the risk that remains after signing. The security team, the data protection officer and the lawyers prepare the findings, but they have no mandate to accept risk on behalf of the company.

In entities covered by the NIS2 Directive, this responsibility also has a formal dimension. Article 20(1) NIS2 requires the management bodies of essential and important entities to approve the cybersecurity risk-management measures and oversee their implementation (as of 18 November 2026). If the target company or the combined organisation falls into this category, the due diligence findings feed decisions that the board has to make anyway.

Every finding should go into the combined organisation’s risk register with an owner, the chosen treatment option and a review date. How to link such a register with policy, board oversight and regulatory requirements is described in the article on governance, risk and compliance in one process.

The handover is easy to overlook: the due diligence team finishes work on the day of signing, and the integration team starts from scratch. The report should therefore contain a list of unknowns to be checked after closing, each with an owner.

What does a cybersecurity due diligence checklist look like?

A cybersecurity due diligence checklist links each area with a question for the seller, the evidence, a warning sign and a consequence for the contract or the integration. The eight areas in the table follow from the ICO decision in the Marriott case and from the GDPR, NIS2 and DORA.

AreaQuestion for the sellerEvidence worth requestingWarning signConsequence
Breaches and incidentsWhich breaches have occurred?breach records (Article 33(5) GDPR)“zero incidents” without recordscompromise assessment
Privileged accountsWho reviews the use of administrator accounts?account export, activity logsshared accounts, no logscredential change on closing day, with the attacker cut off first if their presence has not been ruled out
Databases with personal dataWhich alerts protect tables with data?alert configurationalerts on only some tablesalerts on all tables before integration
EncryptionWhich categories of data are encrypted?database and backup configurationencryption to a single standardextension in the integration budget
System configurationWhich standard were the servers hardened to?configuration review resultssystems without vendor supportremediation condition or price adjustment
IT suppliersWho has remote access to the systems?contracts, ICT supplier register (Article 28(3) DORA)access without named accountsaccess review before closing
Risk managementWho approves security measures?risk analysis policy (Article 21(2)(a) NIS2)no board approvalentry in the risk register
Systems to be retiredWhat will be switched off, and when?schedule with an ownerdeadline without interim controlscontrols until the switch-off date

The evidence column says the most. If the buyer has only an assurance for a given area, the finding goes into the contract or the post-closing plan instead of being treated as closed.

Key takeaways:

  • Every finding goes into the price, the contract, the closing conditions or the post-acquisition plan.
  • A compliance report is a document, not evidence of the technical state.
  • The plan for the first day after closing is drawn up during due diligence, not after it.

How can nFlo help with cybersecurity due diligence?

nFlo helps turn the seller’s assurances into technical evidence where a decision on the deal or the integration plan depends on the state of the systems. The overview of IT systems and infrastructure configuration compares the settings of operating systems, databases, network devices and cloud environments against the CIS Benchmarks and ends with a list of deviations ranked by severity.

The review needs read-only access, so it can be agreed with the target company before signing or carried out right after closing. If you are preparing an acquisition or have just acquired a company and want to know what state its systems are in, contact us.

What else is worth knowing about cybersecurity due diligence?

When should cybersecurity due diligence be carried out?

Before the contract is signed, while the buyer can still influence the price and terms. The scope depends on how many systems and how much personal data are being acquired and on the integration plan.

Is the seller’s audit report or certificate enough?

Not always: a report may be out of date or simply wrong. In the Marriott case, two PCI DSS reports erroneously confirmed multi-factor authentication that was not in place on all accounts with access to card data.

Can the buyer test the target’s systems on its own before the acquisition?

Only with the target company’s consent and within a scope agreed in writing. Until the deal closes, the buyer does not own the systems.

Who should take part in cybersecurity due diligence?

The person responsible for security on the buyer’s side, the data protection officer, the integration architect and the transaction lawyer. The risk that remains after signing is accepted by the board.

What should you do if an incident comes to light after the deal closes?

Activate the incident response plan. If a personal data breach has occurred, Article 33(1) GDPR requires the controller to notify the supervisory authority without undue delay and, where feasible, within 72 hours of becoming aware of it (as of 18 November 2026).

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