In conversations with hospital directors and IT managers at medical facilities, I increasingly hear the same question: “Does this really apply to us?” The answer is yes — with full force. The NIS2 Directive, implemented in Poland through an amendment to the Act on the National Cybersecurity System, covers the healthcare sector as an essential entity. This means the highest level of requirements, the most severe penalties, and direct, personal liability of management for the state of cybersecurity. This is not another paper audit to be filed away — it is a fundamental change in the way risk is managed at medical facilities.
One administrator at a medical facility recently told me that his hospital survived a ransomware attack in 2022 and operated on paper for three weeks. “We thought that was behind us and we had learned our lesson,” he admitted. The problem is that the scale of threats is not decreasing, and legal requirements are growing faster than investments in security. This article is a guide that will walk you through everything a hospital, clinic, or laboratory must implement — concretely, practically, and without unnecessary shortcuts.
Why was the healthcare sector covered by the NIS2 Directive as an essential entity?
Healthcare is one of those sectors where a cyberattack most acutely crosses the boundary between the digital and physical worlds. When systems at a manufacturing plant are locked down by ransomware, the company loses money and time. When the same happens to a hospital, patients may lose their health or their lives. This is not an exaggeration — the attack on a hospital in Düsseldorf in 2020 caused the redirection of an ambulance, which contributed to a patient’s death. It is precisely this type of extreme risk that led EU legislators to place healthcare in Annex I of the NIS2 Directive as a sector of high criticality.
The NIS2 Directive, adopted in December 2022, replaces NIS1 and dramatically expands both the scope of entities subject to regulation and the level of requirements. The previous directive identified specific, pre-selected entities. NIS2 introduces automatic size-based criteria: if an entity exceeds the thresholds defined for a medium-sized company (50+ employees or annual turnover/balance sheet total above EUR 10 million), it is in principle subject to regulation in essential or important sectors.
The healthcare sector was not only placed in the highest category — essential entities — but is treated with particular attention precisely because of its criticality to society. The cyber resilience of a hospital has ceased to be an infrastructural option and has become a condition for legal and safe operation. Member States must ensure effective enforcement of the rules, and supervisory authorities gain broad supervisory powers.
The healthcare sector is classified as an essential entity in Annex I of NIS2. This means the highest level of requirements and a potential penalty of up to EUR 10 million or 2% of global annual turnover — whichever is higher.
📚 Read the complete guide: NIS2: Complete guide to the NIS2 Directive - obligations, penalties, deadlines
Which medical entities are subject to NIS2 — hospitals, clinics, laboratories, pharmacies?
The scope of entities covered by NIS2 in the healthcare sector is broader than most facilities expect. In conversations with hospital directors, I often surprise them with the information that the regulation applies not only to large clinical hospitals, but to the entire ecosystem of medical entities.
The essential entities in the healthcare sector covered by NIS2 are primarily providers of healthcare services — hospitals, both public and private. The directive does not distinguish by form of ownership: a non-public healthcare institution operating a hospital with an emergency department has the same obligations as a clinical hospital affiliated with a medical university, if it meets the size criteria.
Beyond hospitals, NIS2 covers EU reference laboratories, entities conducting research and development activities related to medicinal products, manufacturers of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations, and manufacturers of medical devices deemed critical during public health emergencies. It is worth adding that providers of IT systems for hospitals may themselves be subject to NIS2 as important entities in the digital infrastructure sector or the ICT sector.
On the question of clinics and small facilities — size thresholds are the decisive factor. A standalone clinic employing a few doctors will typically not exceed the thresholds, but a network of private clinics or a diagnostic centre with branches in several cities will. It is worth verifying whether a given facility is part of a larger corporate structure, because in such a case the thresholds are calculated collectively.
Practical rule: if your facility or its parent entity employs more than 50 people or achieves a turnover above EUR 10 million, it is likely subject to NIS2. Check this before the end of 2025 — registration in the national system is an obligation, do not wait to be summoned.
What specific security requirements must medical facilities meet?
Article 21 of the NIS2 Directive is the heart of the technical regulation. It requires essential entities to implement appropriate and proportionate technical, operational, and organisational measures to manage risks to the security of network and information systems. The list of these measures, though non-exhaustive, effectively sets a minimum standard. It is worth emphasising the word “proportionate” — the directive does not require the same from a district hospital and a clinical hospital, but expects from each an awareness of risk and actions adequate to its scale.
The first requirement is the implementation of a risk analysis and information systems security policy — meaning a formal, documented process of identifying, assessing, and managing cybersecurity risk. A once-a-year review before an audit is not sufficient; the directive calls for a continuous, systematic process. This policy must cover both the IT environment (networks, servers, workstations, cloud) and the OT/IoMT environment (medical equipment, building management systems).
The next requirement is an incident handling plan that specifies procedures for detecting, responding to, and reporting incidents. This plan must be tested — a plan sitting in a drawer does not satisfy the NIS2 requirement. The directive also requires ensuring business continuity, including backup and disaster recovery policies. Crucially, this involves defining RTO (Recovery Time Objective) and RPO (Recovery Point Objective) parameters for critical systems — a hospital must know how long it can function without its HIS system and how much data it can afford to lose.
Supply chain security is another element — the hospital must assess the risks associated with suppliers and partners, from HIS system providers to cleaning companies that have physical access to the server room. The application of principles for the secure development and maintenance of systems is required, including vulnerability management and regular updates. Remote service access to medical equipment and HIS systems must be strictly controlled, audited, and time-limited.
Cyberhygiene practices and training are a mandatory element. We cannot expect a nurse to recognise a phishing attack if she has never received training in this area — and medical staff are one of the primary targets of social engineering. ENISA reports that the healthcare sector is the third most frequently attacked sector in the EU, and phishing and social engineering remain the dominant initial attack vectors. Policies and procedures on cryptography and encryption are also required — patient data transmitted between wards, to external laboratories, or to external entities must be encrypted.
Personnel security means verifying employees who have access to critical systems, implementing role-based access management (RBAC), and deploying multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all critical systems and remote access. The principle of least privilege — every user has access only to the data and systems necessary to perform their duties — is a standard that in a hospital must be enforced systemically, not merely declared.
The requirements of Art. 21 NIS2 are a minimum standard, not a maximum. The supervisory authority assesses the adequacy of measures against the facility’s actual risk profile — a large multi-specialty hospital must implement significantly more than a small specialist clinic.
How to conduct a risk analysis at a medical facility in accordance with NIS2?
Risk analysis is the starting point for all further implementation activities. In conversations with IT managers at hospitals, I often hear that “we have something like a risk register in Excel.” That is a good start, but NIS2 requires something far more systematic.
The first step is asset inventory — a complete list of information systems, networks, devices (including networked medical equipment), and data processed at the facility. Without a full asset map, a reliable risk analysis cannot be conducted. In a hospital this task is particularly complex, because the IT/OT environment is heterogeneous: there are HIS systems from one vendor, RIS and PACS from another, medical equipment from a dozen or more manufacturers, plus network infrastructure, telephone systems, access control systems, and BMS systems managing the building.
The next step is the identification of threats and vulnerabilities. The methodology should cover both external threats (ransomware, phishing, attacks on suppliers) and internal ones (employee errors, unauthorised access). For the healthcare sector, threats relating to medical equipment running outdated software, lack of network segmentation, and long replacement cycles for medical hardware are particularly significant.
The risk assessment should take into account the specific medical context — the consequences of the unavailability of the surgery scheduling system or the ICU monitoring system are incomparably more serious than the unavailability of the billing system. Methods such as OCTAVE Allegro, ISO 27005, or NIST SP 800-30 work well in this environment. Importantly, the risk assessment should not be solely technical — it should also encompass business and operational risk analysis: reputational risk, risk of loss of accreditation, and risk of civil liability to patients.
On the basis of the risk analysis, a risk treatment plan must be created: for each identified risk, a determination must be made as to whether it is eliminated, reduced through the implementation of controls, transferred (e.g. through cyber insurance), or accepted. This plan becomes the foundation of the technical and organisational implementation schedule. Every accepted risk must be formally approved by the governing body — management cannot delegate responsibility for risk acceptance solely to the IT department.
A mistake I often see in medical facilities is treating risk analysis as a “technical IT task.” In reality, the key stakeholders are: ward heads (who understand the criticality of clinical processes), the hospital pharmacy manager, the laboratory manager, the data protection officer (GDPR), and above all the management, which must understand and accept the results of the assessment. A good risk analysis is the product of an interdisciplinary team, not a one-page IT report.
Risk analysis in a hospital is not a one-time project — it is a process. NIS2 requires its regular review and update, particularly after every significant incident, change in infrastructure, or the emergence of a new, material threat in the cyberthreat landscape for the healthcare sector.
Which medical systems (HIS, RIS, PACS, e-prescription) require special protection?
Hospital IT infrastructure is one of the most heterogeneous IT environments I encounter in my work with nFlo clients. This results from the fact that medical systems have accumulated over the years, often without central architectural planning, and their lifecycle is much longer than in corporate environments.
The Hospital Information System (HIS) is the core of the hospital’s digital infrastructure — it manages patient data, orders, medical documentation, and hospitalisations. Compromise or unavailability of the HIS paralyses the work of the entire facility. HIS requires special protection: strict access control with the principle of least privilege, encryption of data at rest and in transit, regular backups tested for restorability, and monitoring of user activity.
The Radiology Information System (RIS) and Picture Archiving and Communication System (PACS) are critical environments from the perspective of both diagnostic continuity and the storage of enormous volumes of sensitive data. Medical images are often stored for 10–20 years, which means long-term risk. PACS is particularly exposed due to the frequent use of older network protocols (DICOM) and insufficient segmentation from the rest of the hospital network.
E-prescription and e-referral systems, connected to the infrastructure of the e-Health Centre, have specific security requirements arising from integration with external government systems. Every facility operating within the e-health ecosystem effectively becomes a node in the critical infrastructure network, which raises security requirements.
Hospital pharmacy systems, laboratory information systems (LIS), ICU patient monitoring systems, telemedicine systems — each of these elements requires a dedicated risk assessment. The key problem is that many of these systems run on outdated operating system versions (Windows 7, Windows Server 2008) or on embedded systems without the possibility of updates, which significantly complicates traditional vulnerability management.
Particular attention should be paid to system integration. A hospital rarely has a homogeneous environment — it is typically a mosaic of systems from different vendors, integrated via HL7, FHIR, or dedicated APIs. Every integration point is a potential attack vector. Auditing these integrations, verifying encryption of transmissions, connection authorisation, and access logging is a frequently neglected but critical element of security analysis.
It is also worth discussing Privileged Access Management (PAM) in the context of medical systems. Many administrators of hospital HIS systems operate accounts with domain administrator privileges. This is an enormous risk — the compromise of one account can mean taking control of the entire infrastructure. Implementing PAM, which enforces session-based authorisation, recording of privileged sessions, and regular password rotation, is one of the elements with the highest return on investment in security.
Compensatory security measures for systems that cannot be patched are a necessity in hospitals, not an exception: network segmentation, virtual patching through next-generation firewalls, strict network traffic monitoring, and isolation from the public network. Medical equipment cannot be left on a “flat network” in the hope that the manufacturer will release a patch.
How to organise incident response at a medical facility — reporting requirements?
The NIS2 Directive introduces a three-stage, rigorous incident reporting system. One administrator at a medical facility said to me: “Last year we had a phishing incident — a locked account. Was that a reportable incident?” That is exactly the question every facility must have a ready answer to.
A significant incident subject to the reporting obligation is one that causes or may cause serious disruption of services or significant financial losses for the entity, or which affects or may affect other persons or organisations. For a hospital, the threat of unavailability of the HIS for several hours, encryption of patient data, or compromise of an ICU monitoring system — all of these qualify as significant incidents.
The reporting schedule is unforgiving. An early warning to the CSIRT must be sent within 24 hours of becoming aware of the incident. Not from the moment of its confirmation, not from the conclusion of analysis — from the moment we learn that something is happening. This requires that the incident response procedure is activated almost immediately upon detection of an anomaly.
Within 72 hours of becoming aware of the incident, a more complete notification must be submitted, containing a preliminary assessment of the incident, its severity, and indicators of compromise. A one-month deadline is provided for the final report, which covers a full analysis of root causes, impact, and remediation actions.
In practice, this means a hospital must have a written, tested Incident Response Plan (IR Plan), containing: definitions of incident severity levels, escalation and notification procedures, roles and responsibilities (who decides on reporting, who calls the CSIRT, who informs the board and the media), templates for CSIRT notifications, and procedures for communicating with patients and the public.
Regular tabletop exercises, during which the team walks through a simulation of a serious incident, are indispensable. A plan that has never been tested is not a plan — it is a fiction that reveals its weakness at the worst possible moment.
For hospitals, it is crucial to designate and train a person responsible for contact with the CSIRT, as well as a lawyer prepared to handle the legal aspects of an incident. An attack on a hospital often simultaneously triggers obligations under NIS2, GDPR, and press law — a coordinated team is needed.
How to secure networked medical equipment (IoMT)?
The Medical Internet of Things (IoMT) is one of the most challenging areas of cybersecurity in hospitals. Infusion pumps, ventilators, patient monitors, CT scanners, MRI machines — the modern hospital is tens, often hundreds, of medical devices integrated into the IT network.
The problem is that these devices were designed with medical reliability in mind, not cybersecurity. Many of them run on operating systems that have stopped receiving security updates. Changing or updating software requires manufacturer certification, which means that even when a critical vulnerability is known, the hospital may have to wait months or years for it to be remediated.
The first step is a complete IoMT inventory. Many of my contacts in the medical sector do not know exactly how many medical devices are connected to their network. Without knowing what we have, we cannot protect it. Specialist medical asset discovery platforms (e.g. Claroty, Medigate) can automatically identify and classify IoMT devices without interfering with their operation.
Network segmentation is the key compensatory measure for devices that cannot be patched. Creating dedicated VLANs for medical equipment, isolated from the administrative network and internet access, drastically reduces the attack surface. A device that cannot “communicate” with anything other than a designated data collection system is significantly more secure even with outdated software.
Implementing a network anomaly detection system (NDR/IDS) allows monitoring of network traffic generated by medical equipment for irregularities — a sudden attempt by an ECG device to connect to an external server should immediately trigger an alert.
At the stage of procuring new medical equipment, cybersecurity requirements should be included in the procurement specification. The manufacturer should declare a minimum security support period (the suggested minimum is the device’s lifetime plus 5 years), the principles for delivering security updates, and coordinated vulnerability disclosure. This is not an excessive demand — it is the basic standard of “security by design.”
The EU Medical Devices Regulation (MDR) and NIS2 complement each other in IoMT security requirements. New medical devices placed on the market after 2021 must meet MDR cybersecurity requirements — which makes it easier to enforce these requirements from manufacturers.
What penalties face medical facilities for non-compliance with NIS2?
The penalty system in the NIS2 Directive is designed to be felt even by the largest organisations. For essential entities, to which hospitals belong, the maximum administrative penalty is at least EUR 10 million or 2% of total annual global turnover from the previous financial year — whichever amount is higher.
It is important to understand that these penalties can be imposed independently by different authorities. If a security incident results in a breach of patients’ personal data, the hospital may simultaneously be subject to a penalty under NIS2 (from the KSC supervisory authority), a penalty under GDPR (from the UODO — the Polish Data Protection Authority), and civil liability to affected patients. The sum of potential consequences is therefore many times higher than the NIS2 penalty cap alone.
NIS2 also introduces new supervisory tools not previously provided for under Polish law. For essential entities, the supervisory authority may conduct ex ante inspections — meaning without needing to demonstrate a violation — simply verifying the state of cybersecurity preventively. It may demand information and documentation, conduct on-site inspections, issue binding recommendations, and issue public warnings.
Particularly significant is the sanction against managing persons. The supervisory authority may temporarily prohibit a person from holding a managerial function at the level of chief executive or legal representative if that person has demonstrated gross negligence in fulfilling the obligations arising from NIS2. This shifts managerial motivation from “maybe the hospital can avoid a penalty” to “I may lose my right to hold managerial functions.”
In conversations with hospital directors, I often ask: “Will your insurer ask about NIS2 compliance when renewing your cyber policy?” The answer is yes — increasingly so. Failure to meet NIS2 requirements can result in a claim being denied or a dramatic increase in premiums.
What does the NIS2 implementation roadmap look like for a hospital?
The table below presents a practical, phased NIS2 implementation roadmap for a medical facility. It assumes that the facility starts from a basic level of cybersecurity maturity and has a deadline of end of 2026.
| Phase | Timeline | Key activities | Deliverables | Responsible |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Diagnosis and baseline | Q1 2026 | NIS2 readiness audit (gap analysis), IT/OT/IoMT asset inventory, assessment of current maturity level, workshops with sponsor (management) | NIS2 audit report, asset register, preliminary risk assessment, management decision on budget | Management, CISO/IT, external partner |
| 2. Documentation foundation | Q1–Q2 2026 | Development and implementation of information security policy (ISMS), risk management policy, incident management procedures, BCP/DRP, access and MFA policy | ISMS documentation compliant with NIS2/ISO 27001, IR Plan approved by management, BCP with defined RTO/RPO | CISO, legal department, IT department |
| 3. Technical implementations — priority | Q2–Q3 2026 | Network segmentation (IoMT vs IT vs administration), MFA implementation for critical systems (HIS, PACS, AD), EDR deployment on workstations and servers, configuration audit and hardening | Post-segmentation network architecture documentation, MFA implementation report, EDR implementation report, hardening report | IT department, security partner |
| 4. Monitoring and detection | Q3 2026 | SIEM deployment or SOC service (24/7 monitoring), NDR/IDS deployment for IoMT network, alert configuration and response playbooks, log integration for critical systems | 24/7 monitoring operational, IR playbooks configured, first alerting test report | IT department, SOC (in-house or managed) |
| 5. Supply chain and suppliers | Q3 2026 | IT/medical system supplier inventory, supplier risk assessment (questionnaires), renegotiation of contracts with security clauses, supplier register with assessment | Supplier register with risk classification, updated contracts with key suppliers (HIS, PACS, IT) | Procurement department, legal department, CISO |
| 6. Training and testing | Q3–Q4 2026 | Mandatory cybersecurity training for all staff, dedicated training for management (NIS2 liability), simulated phishing campaign, tabletop IR exercise | Training certificates for management and staff, phishing campaign report, tabletop exercise report | HR, CISO, training department |
| 7. Verification and certification | Q4 2026 | Penetration testing of IT/OT infrastructure, NIS2 compliance audit by external party, documentation review, final report for management | Penetration testing report, audit confirmation of compliance, management-approved ongoing maintenance plan | CISO, management, external auditor |
| 8. Ongoing maintenance | From 2027 | Cyclical risk reviews (minimum annually), documentation updates after changes, CSIRT/advisory monitoring, quarterly awareness training | Quarterly reports for management, updated risk register, evidence of continuity of security processes | CISO, management |
The key lesson from NIS2 implementation projects in the healthcare sector, which we have gathered at nFlo working with more than 200 clients, is that phases 1 and 2 determine the success of the entire programme. Facilities that skip thorough diagnostics and attempt to begin with technology procurement invariably waste time and budget on solutions mismatched to their actual risk profile.
How does nFlo support medical facilities in preparing for NIS2?
At nFlo, we work with medical facilities facing the challenge of NIS2 in an environment where what is at stake is not only legal compliance, but patient safety. We fully understand that a hospital director faces not only the requirements of the directive, but also a limited budget, critical operational continuity, and a complex technological environment built up over the years.
Our starting point is always a NIS2 readiness audit conducted by specialists with experience in the medical sector. The report we deliver is not a list of gaps — it is a prioritised roadmap, ready to be presented to management as the basis for a budget decision. For 98% of clients who have used our services and continued the cooperation, we have successfully guided them through the entire implementation process.
In the technical area, we specialise in IT/OT/IoMT environment segmentation at medical facilities, SIEM/SOC system implementation taking into account the specifics of medical systems, penetration testing of hospital infrastructure (including IoMT equipment), and hardening of critical systems such as HIS and PACS. Our incident response time of less than 15 minutes from detection is a standard that holds particular significance in a medical environment.
In the GRC (Governance, Risk, Compliance) area, we assist with creating complete ISMS documentation compliant with NIS2, developing and testing incident response plans, building supplier risk management processes (SCRM), and delivering training for management and staff. We have experience across 500+ cybersecurity projects and actively track changes in Polish law implementing NIS2.
One administrator at a medical facility we worked with summed it up this way: “I thought I just needed a few IT tools. It turned out I needed a change in the security approach across the entire organisation — and nFlo helped us through that process step by step.”
FAQ — frequently asked questions
Is a small family clinic subject to NIS2?
A standalone small clinic employing a few doctors will generally not meet the NIS2 size thresholds (50+ employees or turnover/balance sheet total above EUR 10 million). However, if the clinic is part of a network or corporate group, the thresholds may be calculated collectively. I recommend verifying your status before the end of 2025.
Is GDPR sufficient to meet NIS2 requirements in a hospital?
No. GDPR and NIS2 have different objectives. GDPR protects personal data; NIS2 protects operational continuity and cyber resilience. Many GDPR processes and documents (e.g. records of processing activities, DPIA impact assessments) can be useful as a starting point, but NIS2 requires a significantly broader scope of action: network segmentation, SOC/SIEM, IT supply chain management, a business continuity plan, and many other elements that GDPR does not cover.
Who in the hospital is responsible for implementing NIS2 — IT or management?
Both, but with different roles. Management (the governing body) bears ultimate, personal legal liability under NIS2 — it must approve policies, oversee implementation, and undergo training. The IT department and CISO are responsible for the operational implementation of technical and organisational measures. Without management engagement, the NIS2 implementation programme has no chance of success.
How quickly after detecting an incident must it be reported to the CSIRT?
An early warning to the CSIRT must be sent within 24 hours of becoming aware of a significant incident. A full notification must follow within 72 hours. The final report is due within one month. These deadlines run from the moment of becoming aware, not from confirmation of the incident or completion of analysis.
Is the HIS system from an external provider within the scope of the hospital’s NIS2 obligations?
Yes. The hospital is responsible for the security of the systems it uses, regardless of whether they are maintained internally or by an external provider. This means the hospital must assess the risk of the HIS supplier, include security clauses in the contract, and monitor the supplier’s compliance with NIS2 requirements. The HIS provider may itself be subject to NIS2 as an entity in the ICT sector, which does not relieve the hospital of its own obligations.
How much does NIS2 implementation cost in a hospital?
Costs vary considerably and depend on the size of the facility, the current level of cybersecurity maturity, and the chosen model (in-house team vs outsourcing). As a rough estimate, a small hospital (100–300 beds) with a low baseline level of security can expect costs in the range of several hundred thousand Polish zlotych in the first year (audit, documentation, technical implementations, training). A large multi-specialty hospital — many times more. It is worth noting that the cost of a successful ransomware attack on a hospital (downtime, data recovery, potential penalties, reputational damage) far exceeds the cost of prevention.
Related concepts
Discover the key terms associated with this article in our cybersecurity glossary:
- NIS2 — NIS2 (Network and Information Security Directive 2) is an EU directive establishing cybersecurity requirements for essential and important entities
- IoT — Internet of Things; in the medical context, IoMT devices: medical equipment connected to a network
- SIEM — Security Information and Event Management, a system for centralised collection and analysis of security logs
- Backup — data backup, a key element of the business continuity plan required by NIS2
- Cybersecurity — the set of techniques, processes, and practices for protecting information systems against threats
Learn more
Read related articles in our knowledge base:
- What is the NIS2 Directive? Definition, objectives, obligations, consequences and deadlines
- What are the main requirements of the NIS2 Directive? A complete guide
- Why is a SOC practically indispensable for KSC/NIS2 compliance?
- NIS2 supply chain audit — how to manage supplier risk?
- Who does the NIS2 Directive apply to? Criteria, sectors and size thresholds
Check our services
Do you need cybersecurity support? See:
- NIS2 Compliance — NIS2 directive compliance for essential entities
- NIS2 Readiness Check — assessment of your facility’s readiness for NIS2
- Security audits — comprehensive assessment of IT/OT security posture
- SOC as a Service — 24/7 security monitoring for medical facilities
Sources
- Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 (NIS2)
- ENISA — “Health Sector Cybersecurity Framework” (2023)
- ENISA — “Threat Landscape for Health Sector” (2023)
- Draft amendment to the Act on the National Cybersecurity System (KSC) — Ministry of Digital Affairs, 2024/2025
- NIST SP 800-30 rev. 1 — Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments
- ISO/IEC 27001:2022 — Information security management systems
- Regulation (EU) 2017/745 on medical devices (MDR)
- CERT Polska — “Report on the state of cybersecurity in Poland” (2024)
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