Traditional threat modeling focuses on identifying what can go wrong in a system. MITRE ATT&CK provides knowledge about how attackers specifically achieve their goals. Combining both approaches creates a powerful tool for building realistic protection.
Why STRIDE or PASTA Alone Isn’t Enough
Limitations of Classic Methodologies
Methodologies like STRIDE or PASTA work well for identifying threat categories, but have a significant limitation - they operate at an abstract level.
STRIDE Example:
Threat: Elevation of Privilege
Description: Attacker may gain higher privileges
Mitigation: Implement access control
That’s true, but not very helpful in practice. It lacks answers to questions:
- What specific techniques do attackers use for privilege escalation?
- Which ones are most commonly used in my industry?
- How do I detect attempts to use them?
What MITRE ATT&CK Brings
The ATT&CK framework fills these gaps:
Tactic: Privilege Escalation (TA0004)
Techniques:
├── T1548 - Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
│ ├── .001 - Setuid and Setgid
│ ├── .002 - Bypass User Account Control
│ └── .003 - Sudo and Sudo Caching
├── T1134 - Access Token Manipulation
├── T1068 - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
└── T1078 - Valid Accounts
For each technique:
- How it works
- Real attack examples
- Detection methods
- APT groups using the technique
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Integrated Model: STRIDE meets ATT&CK
Mapping STRIDE Categories to ATT&CK Tactics
| STRIDE | ATT&CK Tactics |
|---|---|
| Spoofing | Initial Access, Defense Evasion |
| Tampering | Execution, Persistence, Defense Evasion |
| Repudiation | Defense Evasion |
| Information Disclosure | Collection, Exfiltration |
| Denial of Service | Impact |
| Elevation of Privilege | Privilege Escalation, Lateral Movement |
Extended Modeling Process
Classic modeling:
1. Define scope → 2. Draw DFD → 3. Identify threats (STRIDE) → 4. Assess risk → 5. Plan mitigations
Modeling with ATT&CK:
1. Define scope
2. Draw DFD
3. Identify threats (STRIDE)
4. ★ Map to ATT&CK techniques ★
5. ★ Profile potential adversaries ★
6. Assess risk with threat intelligence context
7. Plan mitigations including detection
Practical Methodology Step by Step
Step 1: Adversary Profiling
Before you start modeling threats, define who might attack you.
Example for a manufacturing company:
Potential adversaries:
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ 1. APT groups targeting industrial sector │
│ - APT33 (Elfin) - energy, aviation industry │
│ - APT34 (OilRig) - critical infrastructure │
│ - Sandworm - OT/ICS systems │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ 2. Cybercriminals (ransomware) │
│ - LockBit, BlackCat - opportunistic attacks │
│ - Techniques: phishing → lateral movement → impact │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ 3. Insider threat │
│ - Employees with OT system access │
│ - Techniques: Valid Accounts, Data from Local System│
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Step 2: Creating Threat Profile for a System
For each analyzed system, determine:
A. Attractiveness to attackers:
- What data does it process?
- Does it have access to other systems?
- Does it control physical processes?
B. Attack surface:
- External interfaces (API, web)
- Integrations with other systems
- Management channels (SSH, RDP)
C. Kill chain mapping:
System: Customer portal (web application)
Initial Access:
├── T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application
│ → OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities
├── T1133 - External Remote Services
│ → Admin panel accessible from internet
└── T1566 - Phishing
→ Support staff as targets
Execution:
├── T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter
│ → Command injection possibility
└── T1203 - Exploitation for Client Execution
→ User browsers
Persistence:
├── T1505.003 - Web Shell
│ → Server threat
└── T1078 - Valid Accounts
→ Compromised user/admin accounts
Step 3: Detection Coverage Assessment
For each identified technique, verify:
| Technique | Monitoring? | Data Sources | Gap? |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing App | Partial | WAF logs | No SIEM correlation |
| T1505.003 - Web Shell | No | - | No file monitoring |
| T1078 - Valid Accounts | Yes | AD logs, SIEM | OK |
| T1059.001 - PowerShell | Partial | Endpoint | No script block logging |
Step 4: Prioritization Based on Threat Intelligence
Use data from ATT&CK Navigator and threat intelligence:
Technique prioritization for manufacturing sector:
HIGH (frequently used by APTs):
├── T1566.001 - Spearphishing Attachment (90% of sector attacks)
├── T1486 - Data Encrypted for Impact (ransomware)
├── T1078 - Valid Accounts
└── T1021.001 - Remote Desktop Protocol
MEDIUM:
├── T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application
├── T1105 - Ingress Tool Transfer
└── T1059.001 - PowerShell
LOWER (less common in this sector):
├── T1195 - Supply Chain Compromise
└── T1200 - Hardware Additions
Tools Supporting the Process
ATT&CK Navigator
Coverage and priority visualization:
Layers to create:
1. "Our detections" - techniques we detect
2. "APT targeting manufacturing" - techniques of groups attacking our sector
3. "Gap analysis" - difference between 1 and 2 = priorities
Generating coverage map:
- Export rule list from SIEM
- Map to ATT&CK techniques
- Import to Navigator as layer
- Overlay threat intelligence layer
- Identify gaps
Integration with Threat Modeling Tools
Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool + ATT&CK:
- Standard STRIDE templates
- Add custom properties with ATT&CK technique IDs
- Link to ATT&CK documentation in mitigation notes
OWASP Threat Dragon:
- Open-source alternative
- Ability to add ATT&CK tags
- Export to various formats
Practical Example: Online Payment System
Context
System: E-commerce payment gateway
Processed data: Card data (PCI DSS scope)
Interfaces: REST API, merchant panel, bank integration
Analysis with STRIDE + ATT&CK
| STRIDE Threat | ATT&CK Techniques | Specific Risk |
|---|---|---|
| Merchant impersonation | T1078.004 - Cloud Accounts | API account takeover |
| User impersonation | T1528 - Steal Application Access Token | Session token theft |
Tampering:
| STRIDE Threat | ATT&CK Techniques | Specific Risk |
|---|---|---|
| Transaction amount modification | T1565.001 - Stored Data Manipulation | Database parameter changes |
| Account number substitution | T1557 - Adversary-in-the-Middle | MITM in bank communication |
Information Disclosure:
| STRIDE Threat | ATT&CK Techniques | Specific Risk |
|---|---|---|
| Card data leak | T1005 - Data from Local System | Database dump |
| T1041 - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | Exfiltration via C2 | |
| API key leak | T1552.001 - Credentials In Files | Hardcoded secrets in code |
Mitigation Plan with Detection Use Cases
Threat: T1078.004 - Merchant API account takeover
├── Prevention:
│ ├── MFA for merchant panel
│ ├── IP whitelisting for API calls
│ └── API key rotation every 90 days
├── Detection:
│ ├── Alert: login from new IP/geolocation
│ ├── Alert: sudden transaction volume spike
│ └── Alert: webhook configuration change
└── Response:
├── Automatic block after 3 alerts
└── Merchant notification procedure
Effectiveness Metrics
Indicators to Track
Detection coverage:
Metric: % of ATT&CK techniques with working detection
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Q1 2024: 35% (42/120 techniques)
Q2 2024: 48% (58/120 techniques) ↑
Q3 2024: 61% (73/120 techniques) ↑
Target: 80%
Mean Time to Detect (MTTD):
Analysis per ATT&CK tactic:
Initial Access: avg 4h (target: <1h)
Execution: avg 2h (target: <30min)
Persistence: avg 72h (target: <24h) ← priority
Exfiltration: avg 6h (target: <1h)
Mitigation effectiveness:
Red team exercises - % blocked attacks:
├── Spearphishing: 78% (target: >90%)
├── Credential dumping: 45% (target: >80%) ← gap
├── Lateral movement: 62% (target: >80%)
└── Data exfiltration: 71% (target: >90%)
Organizational Implementation
Implementation Roadmap
Phase 1: Foundation (1-2 months)
- Team training on MITRE ATT&CK
- Mapping existing detections to framework
- First threat model with ATT&CK for critical system
Phase 2: Systematization (3-4 months)
- ATT&CK Navigator integration with threat modeling process
- Automated SIEM rules → ATT&CK techniques mapping
- Creating threat profile library for typical systems
Phase 3: Continuous Improvement (ongoing)
- Regular updates with new ATT&CK versions
- Purple team exercises based on profiles
- Feedback loop: incidents → model updates
Common Pitfalls
1. Trying to cover all techniques
❌ Wrong: "We need to detect all 200+ techniques"
✓ Right: "We prioritize 50 techniques most frequently
used against our sector"
2. Lack of business context
❌ Wrong: Universal threat model for all systems
✓ Right: Customized risk profile per system
considering business criticality
3. Static models
❌ Wrong: Threat model as a one-time document
✓ Right: Living document updated with system changes
and threat landscape evolution
Summary
Combining threat modeling with MITRE ATT&CK brings measurable benefits:
- Realism - threats based on actual attacker techniques
- Prioritization - focus on techniques relevant to your sector
- Measurability - concrete coverage and effectiveness metrics
- Common language - standard terminology for security, IT, and business teams
The key is an iterative approach: start with critical systems, build team competencies, then scale the process across the organization.
Need support with threat modeling using MITRE ATT&CK? Contact us - we’ll conduct threat modeling workshops tailored to your organization’s specifics and industry.
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